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Southern Kurils or Northern Territories?
Resolving the Russo-Japanese Border Dispute

Although the guns of World War I1 were mercifully
silenced over forty-five years ago, Japan and Russia (formerly
the Soviet Union) have regrettably never formally concluded
the war. The on-going conflict is caused by a boundary dispute
involving a small group of islands, just north of Hokkaido,
known by the Russians as the Southern Kuril' Islands, but
known to the Japanese as the Northern Territories.
The total area of the disputed territory is not large: but
conflicting claims to the islands have prevented both countries
from signing a formal treaty to end the Second World War.3
Important factors bearing on each country's reluctance t o give
up the Kurils include strategic significance, a valuable fishing
The lengthy dispute has
industry, and emotional atta~hment.~
gained new significance in light of r e c e ~ tdevelopments in the
former Soviet Bloc-the quarrel over the islands constitutes a
major barrier in negotiations for much needed economic aid
from Japan to the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent state^.^
This comment analyzes both the Russian and Japanese
claims to these islands from a strictly legal, as opposed to political, standpoint. Section I1 of this comment presents a factual
overview of the problem. Section I11 briefly discusses the dis1. Sometimes spelled "Kurile." This comment uses "Kuril" except when quoting
or directly referring to sources which use "Kurile."
2.
Together, the islands make up an area of 4996 square kilometers.
RAJENDRA K. JAIN, THE USSR AND JAPAN
1945-1980 50 (1981); MINISTRYOF
NORTHERNTERRITORIES3 (1987) [hereinafter
FOREIGNAFFAIRS,JAPAN, JAPAN'S
JAPAN'S NORTHERN
TERRITORIES].
3.
JAPAN'S
NORTHERN
TERRITORIES,
supra note 2, a t 1.
4.
See, e.g., JOHN
J. STEPHAN,THE KURIL ISLANDS119-24, 208-09 (1974);
JAPAN'S
NORTHERN
TERRITORIES,
supra note 2, at 1.
5.
See Ronald E. Yates, Japan, Soviets Seek Accord over Islands, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 14, 1991, 8 1, at 21; Japan Asks Soviets for Two Islands Now, WASH.RMES,
Mar. 20, 1991, at A7. Following the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union in 1991,
the Kurils became part of the Russian Federation. Japan Recognizes Russia,
AGENCEFRANCEPRESS, Dec. 27, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni
File.
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pute in terms of customary international law. Section IV considers the legal claims to the islands based on international
agreements. This comment concludes that Japan has strong
legal claims to part, but not all, of the disputed territory.
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The Kurils6 are a chain of over thirty volcanic islands that
stretch approximately 1200 kilometers in a northeast to southwest axis from the southern tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula t o
the northeastern tip of Hokkaido. The Russo-Japanese boundary dispute centers around four of these islands. Two of the
islands, Etorofu7 and Kunashiri: are the southernmost
islands of the Kuril chain. The other disputed islands lie southeast of Etorofu and Kunashiri. They are known in Russia as
the "Little Kurils" and in Japan as Shikotan and the Habomai
island^.^ As a whole, Russia refers to the disputed islands as
the "Southern Kurils and Little Kurils," while Japan calls the
islands its "Northern Territ~ries."'~Sakhalin Island, not a
part of the Kurils, also has historical significance in the dispute. Sakhalin lies along the Eurasian coast directly west of
the Kuril chain."
Russo-Japanese contests for control of Sakhalin and the
Kuril Islands have existed for as long as the history of the islands is verifiable. Japanese and Russian writers disagree as t o
who was actually the first to discover and settle the Kurils.12
Unless otherwise specifled, the term "Kuril Islands" in this comment means
6.
the entire chain of Kuril Islands, including the four disputed islands.
InRussian, Yturup."
7.
8.
In Russian, "Kunashir."
supra note 4, at 11.
9.
STEPHAN,
THE SOVIETUNIONAND POSTWARJAPAN:ESCA10. See RODGERSWEARINGEN,
LATING CHALLENGE
AND RESPONSE 186-88 (1978). Some extreme Japanese groups
have made claims to the entire chain of the Kuril Islands as well as the southern
half of Sakhalin Island. STEPHAN,supra note 4, at 197. However, the official
position of the Japanese government limits territorial claims to the four islands
TERRITORIES,
supra note 2.
described in the text. See JAPAN'S NORTHERN
J. STEPHAN,
SAKHALIN:
A HISTORYv (1971) [hereinafter SAKHALIN:A
11. JOHN
HISTORY]. The Japanese refer to Sakhalin as Karafuto.
12. An exchange between the Russian and Japanese negotiators to the 1855
Treaty of Shimoda provides an excellent example of the difficulty of determining
who had first claim on the Kurils. In arguing that the Kurils belonged to Russia,
Admiral Putiatin urged that the Russians had lived on the northern islands for
over 100 years. The Japanese were not impressed, however, and quickly retorted
that the Japanese had been there for over 1000 years! Neither claim is documentMURDOCH,
A HISTORYOF
ed. STEPHAN,supra note 4, at 87. See also 3 JAMES
JAPAN, part 2, 595 (Joseph H. Longford ed., Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. 1964).
Undoubtedly, the issue has become politicized. STEPHAN,supra note 4, at 31.
As an example of the political aspect of the discovery issue, Stephan states that a
"book published [by a Russian historian] as late as June 1945 conceded that [the]
Japanese . . . discovered Kunashir, Shikotan, and the Habomais, but this passage
was deleted in a revised edition that appeared two years later." Id. at 204 (citing
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Regardless of who was first, it seems reasonable to conclude
that by the end of the eighteenth century, Russia had closer
ties with the northern Kurils while Japan had closer ties with
the southern islands.13
The Treaty of Shimoda, signed in 1855, established the
first Russo-Japanese boundary line in the Kurils between the
islands of Etorofu and Uruppu.14 Japan received rights to
Etorofu and all islands to the south while Russia received
Uruppu and all islands to the north.15 The Treaty of Shimoda
was amended in 1875 by the Treaty of St. Petersburg.16 This
treaty gave Japan full right and title to the entire Kuril Island
chain. In exchange, Japan ceded to Russia any and all of its
claims to Sakhalin Island.'? Japan reclaimed the southern
half of Sakhalin at the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War
with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905."

A. So~ovIov,KURILSKIEOSTROVA 6 (1945); A. SOLOVIOV,KURILSKIEOSTROVA 4-7
(1947)).
See STEPHAN,
supra note 4, at 31-56.
13.
STEPHAN,supra note 4, a t 88. The Treaty of Shimoda was the result of a
14.
series of peaceful negotiations between Japanese and Russian representatives. See
icl. a t 86-88.
15.
Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation between Japan and
Russia, Feb. 7, 1855, Japan-Russia, art. 11, 112 Consol. T.S. 467-471 (French text),
reprinted in STEPHAN,supra note 4, a t 237 (English translation) (citing JAPAN,
FOREIGNOFFICE,TREATIESAND CONVENTIONS
BETWEENTHE EMPIREOF JAPAN
AND
OTHER POWERSTOGETHERWITH UNIVERSALCONVENTIONS,
REGULATIONS
AND
COMMUNICATIONS
SINCEMARCH1854, a t 585 (rev. ed. 1884)) [hereinafter Treaty of
Shipoda]. The Treaty of Shimoda specifically left unpartitioned the island of
Sakhalin (located along the coast of northeast Asia and not part of the Kurils). Id.
Article I1 of the Treaty of Shimoda is reproduced in the appendix. See also HUGH
MODERNCENTURY38 (1955); JAIN, supra note 2, a t 1, 50; 3
BORTON,JAPAN'S
MURDOCH,supra note 12, a t 612; STEPHAN,supra note 4, a t 88; SWEARINGEN,
supra note 10, at 5.
16.
Treaty for the Mutual Cession of Territory between Japan and Russia, May
7, 1875, Japan-Russia, art. 11, 149 Consol. T.S. 179-82 (French text), reprinted in
STEPHAN,supra note 4, a t 237-38 (citing JAPAN, FOREIGNOFFICE, DAI NIHON
GAIKOBUNSHO,VIII, 216-26 (1940)) (English translation) [hereinafter Treaty of St.
Petersburg]. Article I1 of the Treaty of St. Petersburg is reproduced in the appendix. The 1875 treaty was also the result of peaceful negotiations between Japan
and Russia. See STEPHAN,supra note 4, a t 92-95.
17. See STEPHAN,supra note 4, a t 93-94; JAIN, supra note 2, a t 50-51;
SWEARINGEN,
supra note 10, a t 5, 189. The Japanese public apparently was unhappy with the Treaty of St. Petersburg because of the general feeling that Japan had
traded Japanese territory (Sakhalin Island) in exchange for territory they felt
already belonged to Japan (the Northern Kurils). See STEPHAN,supra note 4, a t
94-95. This suggests that the Japanese gave little credence to the Treaty of
Shimoda.
18.
SAKHALIN:
A HISTORY,supra note 11, a t 198. Both countries were unhappy
with the treaty because both felt they had legitimate claims to all of Sakhalin
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In the early part of World War 11, the Russians and the
Japanese mutually agreed t o what has been described as a
"strange neutrality."lg Both countries promised t o maintain
"peaceful and friendly relations" with each other.20 Yet, at
least one historian surmises that "neither side felt bound to
[honor] the Neutrality Pact. . . one moment longer than it
served strategic needs."21 The Soviet Union expressly
renounced the Neutrality Pact by signing the secret Yalta
Under the agreement, the
Agreement on February 11, 1945.~~
Soviets promised to join the war effort against Japan within
two months after Germany's surrender. In exchange, the United States and Great Britain promised to return Sakhalin Island and to "hand over" the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union.23
The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 9,
1945.~~
The Russian invasion of the Kurils began on August
18, three days after Japan ~ u r r e n d e r e dBy
. ~ ~September 4, the
Russian armada had taken possession of the entire Kuril Island chain, including the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri,
. ~ ~September 20, all property
Shikotan, and the H a b o m a i ~On
on the islands was nationalized and all of the islands were
declared Soviet territory? The Soviet Constitution was
amended to include the islands as part of the Soviet Union on
February 25, 1947." With only a few exceptions, the Japanese
on the Kurils were repatriated in the years 1947-50.~'
The most recent international agreement regarding the
status of the Kuril Islands is the San Francisco Peace Treaty of

Island. See id. a t 80-81.
GEORGEA. LENSEN,THE STRANGE
NEUTRALITY:SOVIETJAPANESE
RELATIONS
19.
DURINGTHE SECOND
WORLDWAR 1941-1945 (1972).
SovietJapanese Neutrality Pact, Apr. 13, 1941, art. I, reprinted in STEPHAN,
20.
supra note 4, at 239-40 (citing JAPAN, FOREIGNOFFICE, NIHON GAIKO NENPYO
NARABIS m O BUNSHO,11, 491-92 (1965)) [hereinaRer Neutrality Pact]. Articles I111 of the Neutrality Pact are reproduced in the appendix.
21.
STEPHAN,supra note 4, a t 144.
22.
Crimea (Yalta) Conference, 1945: Entry of Soviet Union into W a r Against
Japan, Feb. 11, 1945, 3 Bevans 1022 [hereinafter Yalta Agreement]. The relevant
text of the Yalta Agreement is reproduced in the appendix.
Id.
23.
24.
STEPHAN, supra note 4, a t 160.
Id. at 162-64.
25.
Id. at 165-66.
26.
Id. at 168.
27.
Id. at 169.
28.
Id. at 166-69.
29.
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1951. In that document, Japan renounced "all right, title and
claim to the Kurile island^."^^ The Soviet Union was not a
signatory to this treaty, nor to any other treaty formally ending
the war with Japan.

One important source of international law is "international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."31
Historically, discovery, occupation, and conquest have all been
recognized methods of acquiring territory under customary
international law.3z In light of customary international law,
the dispute over the Kurils raises two issues. The first is
whether either country can validly claim sovereignty over the
disputed islands based on prior discovery and occupation. The
second is whether Russia may claim sovereignty over any or all
of the disputed islands based on conquest.33

A. Prior Discovery and Occupation
A fundamental tenet of the Japanese argument is that the
four islands in dispute (Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the
Habomai group) were discovered and settled by the Japanese
and, prior to 1945, had never been occupied by any country
other than Japan. A publication by the Japanese Government,
seeking to rally a movement for the return of the four disputed
islands, states, "Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands were known
to the Japanese long before they became known to the Russians. It was Japan which actually developed these northern
regions . . . . [Tlhe Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu
have never been the territory of a foreign country but have
always been inherent Japanese territory."34 Other sources also
document Japan's historical claims of prior discovery and sett l e m e ~ ~On
t . ~the
~ other hand, the Russians discount Japan's
30.
Multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, art. II, para. c, 3
U.S.T.3169, 3172 [hereinafter Treaty of Peace with Japan]. Article 11, paragraph c
of the Treaty of Peace with Japan is reproduced in the appendix. As will be noted,
infrcz note 125 and accompanying text, Japan claims that the four islands in
dispute are not part of the "Kurile Islands."
JOSEPH
M. SWEENEY ET AL., CASESAND MATERIALSON THE INTERNATIONAL
31.
LEGALSYSTEM2 (3d ed. 1988).
32.
See infia part 1II.A-B.
33. Claims based on international agreements are examined below. See infia
part IV.
34.
JAPAN'S
NORTHERNTERRITORIES,
supra note 2, a t 4, 6.
35.
See, e.g., JAIN, supra note 2, a t 52 ("Japan's position is that the [islands]
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historical claims and argue that Russians were the first to discover the K ~ r i l s . ~ ~
The idea that a sovereign state may obtain territory by
right of discovery and occupation is hardly open to dispute.
Professor Gerhard von Glahn wrote:
Discovery is the oldest and, historically, the most important
method of acquiring title to territory. Up to the eighteenth
century, discovery alone sufficed to establish a legal title, but
since then such discovery has had to be followed by an effective occupation in order to be recognized a s the basis of a title
to territ~ry.~'

Hugo Grotius referred to occupation of territory as "the only
natural and primary mode of a c q u i s i t i ~ n . "Writers
~~
of international law treatises are in unanimous agreement that "occupation" of unappropriated territory is a valid method of acquiring territory under traditional (customary) international law.39
However, the requirement of occupation has not always
been a part of international law. In prior centuries, mere discovery of new territory appears to have given valid title to
territory.40 It is unclear exactly when the requirement of occupation arose and whether it existed a t the time the Kurils were
discovered. One writer suggests that the requirement arose i n
the eighteenth ~ e n t u r y . ~ '
Even if the historical law of prior discovery were clear,
applying it in the case of the Kuril islands would pose great
difficulty since it is unclear who discovered and occupied the

are 'inalienable' and 'inherent' Japanese lands"); STEPHAN,supra note 4, at 209
(popular consensus in Japan is that Kurils are historically Japanese).
supra note 10,
36.
See STEPHAN,supm note 4, a t 31, 87. See also SWEARINGEN,
at 189-90 (recounting Japanese and Soviet historical claims).
37.
GERHARD
VON G u m , LAW AMONG NATIONS311 (5th ed. 1986).
E AC PACISLIBRI T ~ s ,bk. 11, ch. 111, §
38.
2 HUGOGROTWS,DE J ~ BELLI
IV, cl: 1 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925); see also E. DE VAITEL, THE LAW OF
LAW,bk. I, $ 207 (Charles G. Fenwick
NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
trans., 1916).
39.
TO CONTEMPORARY
INTERNACHEN,AN INTRODUCTION
See, e.g., LUNG-CHU
TIONAL LAW 118-19 (1989) (occupation of unappropriated territory is a method of
INTERacquiring territory under traditional international law); 3 J.H.W. VEELZIJL,
NATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
349-53 (1970) (occupation of terra
nullius is valid for state acquisition of territory); CHARLESG. FENWICK,INTERNATIONAL LAW 343-44 (3d ed. 1948) (occupation is the most important method of
acquiring territory as between states).
40.
See 3 VERZIJL,supra note 39, a t 325.
41.
FENWICK,supra note 39, at 344 (footnote omitted).
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Kurils first.42Given this difficulty, the best analytical solution
is to resolve the issues by examining the alternatives.
To simplify the issues as much as possible, assume that
whichever country first discovered the disputed islands complied with the international law sufficient to obtain title to the
territory. Under this assumption, the only issue to be resolved
is whether the discovering country may continue to base its
claim to the territory on right of prior discovery.
I n Russia's case, the historical claim fails. Any "prior discovery" claims Russia may have had to the disputed islands
were bartered away in the Treaty of Shimoda in 1855." Under the express terms of that treaty, Russia gave up all of its
claims to the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and
Habomai in exchange for clear title to the northern Kuril Isl a n d ~Subsequent
.~~
treaties and events modified the Treaty of
Shimoda and further abrogated Russia's historical claims to the
disputed t e r r i t ~ r i e s . ~ ~
The Japanese claim of prior discovery,. though slightly
stronger, is not strong enough to resolve the conflict completely. Under the assumption that Japan secured title to the islands by first discovery and occupation, its title remains clear
at least until World War 11. However, the treaties and international agreements arising out of World War I1 may give Japan
the same legal problems as the Treaty of Shimoda gave Russia,
at least insofar as the Japanese claim to the islands is based on
prior discovery. Arguably, Japan gave away its claim to the
islands by accepting the Potsdam Declaration and by signing
the Treaty of San Francisco. A full discussion of these agreements, including their legal effect and the weight of the argument that Japan gave away its claims to the islands, is reserved for Section IV.

42.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
43.
See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. It is perhaps axiomatic that
international agreements such as treaties modify and preempt customary international law. As one writer notes, "States may abrogate a customary rule simply by
concluding a treaty . . . ." MARK E. VILLIGER,
CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
TREATIES
36 (1985). Villiger also argues that, while a treaty abrogates customary
law, new customary law may in turn modify a treaty. Id.
44.
Treaty of Shimoda, supra note 15, art. II.
45.
For a discussion of subsequent treaties, see infra part IV.B.1.
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B. Conquest
The events that occurred at the close of World War I1 raise
the second question of whether the Soviet Union may claim
title to the Northern Territories based on conquest. It is undisputed that, at the close of the war, Soviet forces invaded all of
the Kurils and successfully occupied them." However, the legal effect of the Soviet take-over of the islands is less clear.
The first issue to resolve is whether, in 1945, international
law permitted a country to acquire title to territory by
conquest. As is often the case in international law, the authorities do not provide a clear an~wer.~'
In the past, conquest was
clearly a "common and legally recognized form of acquisition of
title to territory?' More recently, this rule has been modified,
although precisely when and to what extent the rule has
changed is difficult to determine. By examining the writings of
international legal scholars who wrote at or near the middle of
this century, one discovers at least four different views.
First, some scholars who wrote during the 1940s and 1950s
felt that conquest remained a valid way for a state t o acquire
new territory. One respected scholar, writing in 1952 on a
conquerorysability to annex territory, stated that "[ilnternational [llaw sets no limit-other than that determined by compelling considerations of humanity-to the discretion of the victor
~~
in determining the conditions of the a r m i s t i ~ e . "However,
this view ignores a trend among the family of nations by the

See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
46.
47.
In addressing an unrelated international legal question, a U.S. District
Court Judge lamented the difficulty that often arises in attempting to define
international law. He stated, "The absence of a consensus on international law,
particularly with respect to technical issues created by the wide array of legal
systems in the world, makes it 'hard even to imagine that harmony ever would
characterize this issue.' " Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1427 (C.D. Cal.
1985) (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 778 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)).
SWEENEN
48.
ET AL., supra note 31, at 889; see also 3 VERZIJL,supra note 39,
supra note 39, at 360.
at 356; FENWICK,
49.
2 L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL
LAW8 265a (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed.
THE LAWOF NATIONS171-72 (Humphrey Waldock ed.,
1952); see also J.L. BRIERLY,
6th ed. 1963) (stating that there may be moral objections to obtaining title by
LAW269-70 (2d
conquest, but it still occurs); CHARLESG. FENWICK,INTERNATIONAL
ed. 1934) (recognizing conquest as a method of obtaining legal title). By 1948,
Fenwick had apparently experienced a change of heart. See infra notes 54-56 and
accompanying text.

,
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1940s not to recognize conquest as a valid method of territorial
a~quisition.~'
A second view found in the writings of mid-century legal
scholars is that acquisition of territory by conquest is possible,
but only on condition that the conqueror formally annex the
territory in question.51"Conquest is the taking of possession of
territory of an enemy state by [military] force; it becomes a
mode of acquisition of territory-and hence of transfer of sovereignty--only if the conquered territory is effectively reduced to
possession and annexed by the conquering state."52This view
has the weakness of placing form over substance. Once a state
has taken territory by conquest and firmly possesses it, unilateral annexation of that territory is a mere formality. This suggested rule also lacks any sort of compelling rationale.
The third view is that the legality of acquisition of territory
by conquest is, at best, q~estionable.~~
International legal
scholar Charles Fenwick supported this proposition in his 1948
edition of International Law. Fenwick wrote, 'With the adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1920 and with
the formal renunciation of war as an instrument of national
policy by the Kellogg Pact[,] conquest lost its validity as a
[method of obtaining] legal title to territory."54Fenwick supported his position by noting that when hostilities erupted
between Bolivia and Paraguay in 1932, nineteen American
Republics announced to the two countries that " 'they [would]
not recognize any territorial arrangement of this controversy
which has not been obtained by peaceful means nor the validity
of territorial acquisitions which may be obtained through occupation or conquest by force or arms.'"55 In addition, Fenwick
referred t o the 1940 Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Ameri50.
See infia notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
See 1 GREENH . HACKWORTH,
DIGESTOF INTERNATIONAL
LAW427 (1940); cf.
51.
1 CHARLESC. HYDE,INTERNATIONAL
LAW 5 106 (2d ed. 1945) (property may be
transferred by conquest and formal annexation but states are concerned with
whether it may be done unilaterally). As previously stated, supra notes 26-28 and
accompanying text, the Soviet Union did officially annex the territory it took from
Japan by conquest a t the close of World War 11.
52.
1 HACKWORTH,supra note 51, at 427.
53.
See OSCAR SVARLTEN,
AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAWOF NATIONS178 (1955)
("The legality, under any and all circumstances, of the acquisition of territory
through conquest and subjugation is . . . open to question.").
54.
FENWICK,
supm note 39, a t 360.
55.
Id. a t 361 (quoting Report of the League of Nations Commission on the
Chaco Dispute Between Bolivia and Paraguay, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 137, 168 (Supp.
1934)).
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can Republics a t Havana, which addressed the conquests of the
Axis powers in Europe. The ministers then declared that
" 'force can not constitute the basis of rights, and [the American
Republics] condemn all violence whether under the form of conquest, of stipulations which may have been imposed by the
belligerents in the clauses of treaty, or by any other
process."'56 Thus, Fenwick provided solid support for the
proposition that, by the end of World War 11, acquisition of
territory by conquest was no longer recognized as a valid method of acquiring title to land.
The fourth mid-century view of conquest as a claim to
territory holds that, in a real world sense, the issue presents a
"political rather than a legal q~estion."~'Under this view,
whether territory may be taken by conquest distills into a political question of whether territory is taken by "aggrandizement"
or in good faith to defend oneself against the aggressor
state.58While this theory may reflect the real world of international relation^:^ it does not resolve the question of whether
Russia is obligated, under international law, to return to Japan
the islands conquered by the Soviet Union a t the end of World
War 11.
The third view stated above is probably the most accurate
summation of the state of the law a t the end of World War 11.
Fenwick gives persuasive examples to support the view that, by
mid-century, conquest of territory was not a legally recognized
method of obtaining title to lands. In fact, the examples cited
by Fenwick show that acquisition of territory by forceful conquest was condemned by the international community.
Sound policy considerations also dictate that conquest
should not be recognized as a method of obtaining title to
lands. By not recognizing conquest as a valid means of acquiring lands, the nations of the world announce that they will
allow other countries to "seek no aggrandizement, territorial or
other."60 This position furthers the desirable policy of protecting territorial integrity.

56.
Id. at 361 (quoting DIVISION
OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW,CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT
FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACE, THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCES
OF AMERICAN
STATES
1889-1928, at 373 (Supp. I 1940)).
Id.
57.
58.
Id. at 361-62.
See 3 VERZIJL, supra note 39, at 357-58 (citing several examples of "unlaw59.
ful" annexations by conquest that have occurred in our century).
60.
Atlantic Charter, Aug. 14, 1941, U.S.-U.K., 55 Stat. 1603 (1942).
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This analysis shows that any Soviet claim to the disputed
islands based on "conquest" is, at best, questionable. First, the
legality of title by conquest under any circumstances is doubtful. Second, the Soviet takeover of the islands violated the
policy of territorial integrity. Prior to 1945, the Soviet Union
Because the Soviet
had no claim t o the Northern Territ~ries.~'
invasion of the islands occurred after Japan had unconditionalthe Soviet invasion fails to satisfy the princily ~urrendered,~'
ple of "no aggrandi~ement."~~

IV. INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS
A. Certain Background Rules Governing
International Agreements
Before analyzing specific international agreements relating
t o the four disputed islands, this section will examine some
basic ground rules regarding the international law of treaties.
This subsection will discuss rules regarding (1) the binding
effects of international agreements on third parties, and (2) the
interpretation of international agreements. Once these basic
ground rules are set forth, the next subsection will examine,
chronologically, the conflicting claims under the relevant international agreements.
1. The binding effect of international agreements on third

parties
Articles 34, 35, and 36 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties set forth the rules regarding the effect of an
international agreement on states not parties to the
agreement.64Article 34 states the general rule that "[a] treaty
does not create either obligations or rights for a third State
See infia notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
61.
Japanese Emperor Hirohito broadcast Japanese acceptance of the Potsdam
62.
Declaration on August 15, 1945. The Soviet invasion began three days later. The
disputed islands were all conquered by September 4, 1945. STEPHAN,supra note 4,
a t 160-66.
63.
Atlantic Charter, supra note 60, a t 1603.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May
64.
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention entered into force on January 27, 1980. Although the Convention was not in
force at the time the relevant treaties discussed in the text were concluded, the
Convention does provide solid evidence of governing customary law. See SWEENEY
ET AL., supra note 31, at 993. Articles 31 and 32 of the V i e ~ aConvention are
reproduced in the appendix.
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without its ~onsent."~
However, this general principle is modified by Articles 35 and 36.
Article 35 explains when an international agreement can
create obligations on the part of States not a party t o the
agreement. The article reads, "An obligation arises for a third
State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty
intend the provision to be the means of establishing the obligation and the third State expressly accepts that obligation in
writing."66 This language establishes two prerequisites for a
treaty to be binding on a third party. First, the parties t o the
treaty must intend to create an obligation on the part of the
non-participating state. Second, the non-party state must expressly accept the obligation in writing. The wording of the
Convention requires that both of these prerequisites be satisfied.
Article 36 explains when a state not a party to an international agreement may obtain rights under the agreement. In
relevant part, the article states:
A right arises for a third State from a provision of a
treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a group of
States to which it belongs, or to all States, and the third
State assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as
the contrary is not indicated, unless the treaty otherwise
provides.67

'

Again, the parties to the treaty must have intended t o
create a right in the non-party state. The second prerequisite
requires the non-party state to agree to receive the right given
it by the treaty. Unlike Article 35, however, Article 36 states
that this second element will be presumed as long as there is
no contrary indication from the non-party state. Commentators
generally agree that these rules correctly state the effect of
international agreements on third parties.68
65.
Vienna Convention, supra note 64, art. 34.
Id. art. 35.
66.
Id. art. 36.
67.
See, e.g., VON GLAHN,supra note 37, at 505; IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES
OF
68.
PUBLICINTERNATIONAL
LAW622-25 (4th ed. 1990); cfi 1 OPPENHEIM,
supra note 49,
$4 522-22a (treaty cannot give rights to non-party except by unanimous implied
consent of all concerned and noting that the League of Nations could impose duties
supra note 49, at 325-27 (parties to treaty may
on non-member states); BRIERLY,
confer a right on non-party if intent is shown); 1 GEORGSCHWARZENBERGER,
INTERNATIONAL
LAW 458-61 (3d ed. 1957) (rights and duties may be imposed on
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2. Interpretation of international agreements
With respect to the rules governing the interpretation of
treaties, commentators take two polar position^.^' One side
holds that "the text of an international agreement speaks for
itself, and the task of interpretation is simply to give it a 'plain
and ordinary' meaning."70 Others argue that external
evidence, such as the context of the treaty, its objects and purposes, and the preparatory work of the treaty, should be accorded equal weight with the text.?'
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention represent
neither a strictly textual nor a strictly contextual approach.
Rather, those articles combine the essential elements of both
theories of interpretation. Article 31 provides that the starting
point for treaty interpretation is the "ordinary meaning" of the
text contained in the agreement.72 In addition, the context of
the treaty shall be considered as it is contained in the preamble, annexes, and related agreements of the parties or agreements accepted by the parties. These extraneous agreements, if
any, must have been made "in connection" with the treaty
being interpreted. Article 31 also stipulates that consideration
shall be given to subsequent agreements, subsequent practice,
or rules of international law. Furthermore, the parties may
give a special meaning to any term.73In the event interpretation under Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or is absurd, Article 32 provides that "[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its concl~sion."~~
Although commentators do not agree on the proper rules of
treaty interpretation, "[mlost modern writers agree that two
principles govern . . . in the interpretation of treaties."75 These
principles are: "(1) the subject of interpretation [i.e., the text] is
to determine the real meaning of the parties[] accepting the
-

non-parties with their consent or acquiescence).
See generally SWEENEY
ET AL., supra note 31, at 1017-35 (setting forth the
69.
arguments for and against using extrinsic sources to interpret treaties).
CHEN,supra note 39, at 278.
70.
71.
Richard D. Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J.
INT'L L. 495, 519-20 (1970).
72.
Vienna Convention, supra note 64, art. 31.
Id.
73.
74.
Id. art. 32.
VON GLAHN,
supra note 37, at 502.
75.
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instrument; and (2). . . a treaty must be assumed not to be
intended to be without effect or even to be abs~rd."'~Therefore, in interpreting international agreements regarding the
Russo-Japanese territory dispute, this comment looks first at
the "ordinary meaning" of the text of the agreements, and then,
if necessary, to other related agreements, subsequent agreements, subsequent behavior, and the circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement.

B. International Agreements Relevant to the Russo-Japanese
Boundary Dispute
The last 150 years have witnessed a complex series of
agreements between Japan, Russia, and other interested nations, many of which have important ramifications in any attempt to resolve the boundary dispute between Russia and
Japan. The most useful way to analyze these agreements is to
approach them in chronological order. Accordingly, this section
is divided into the following subsections: (1) the early agreements (1855-1905); (2) the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact
(1941); (3) the Cairo Declaration (1943); (4) the Yalta Agreement of the major allied powers of World War I1 (1945); (5) the
Potsdam Declaration of the major allied powers (1945); and ( 6 )
the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951).
1. The early agreements (1855-1905'

This subsection briefly discusses the legal effects of three
treaties between Japan and Russia, namely, the Treaty of
Shimoda (1855), the Treaty of St. Petersburg (1875), and the
Treaty of Portsmouth (1905). As explained earlier,?? the 1855
Treaty of Shimoda drew a Russo-Japanese boundary line between the islands of Etorofu and Uruppu. This is the same
boundary the Japanese seek to establish today. Some Japanese
go so far as to propose that this treaty should be recognized
today. For example, one historian recently stated, " 'The dispute has come full circle-back to that original Shimoda
[Tlreaty signed by the shogun and the czar in 1855. . . . The
question now is how the two sides can save face while essentially agreeing to recognize a treaty signed 136 years ago.' "78

76.
77.
78.

Id.
See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
Yates, supra note 5, 8 1, at 21, 24 (quoting Japanese historian Yumiko
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Although such a n argument may seem to be good policy, it
is not good law because the 1855 Treaty can no longer have
any binding effect. Under international legal rules, it is clear
that the 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg extinguished the 1855
Treaty of Shimoda at least insofar as the two treaties set
boundaries in the Kuril Islands. Article 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties aptly expresses the rule:
1. A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the
parties to it conclude a later treaty relating to the same subject-matter and:

....

(b) The provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible
with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not
capable of being applied at the same time."

Comparison of the relevant provisions of the 1855 treaty
with the relevant provisions of the 1875 treaty plainly illustrates that the two are incompatible. The Treaty of Shimoda
established a boundary "between the islands of Etorofu and
Uruppu," with Japan owning all islands from Etorofu south.80
In the later treaty of St. Petersburg, Russia expressly ceded all
"the Kuril islands which [it] possess[ed]" and placed the boundary line "between . . . Kamchatka and the islands of
S h i r n u s h ~ . "The
~ ~ result was to give Japan title to the entire
Kuril chain. These separate provisions cannot co-exist. Consequently, the former is abrogated by the contents of the latter.
The relevant provision of the Treaty of Shimoda must be considered a s having no legal effect after 1875, except insofar a s
the 1855 treaty can give meaning (i.e., by interpretation) to
later treaties.
The 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth has nothing more than
historical signXicance in the present debate. That treaty simply
gave the Southern half of Sakhalin to Japan, but did not affect
Japan's sovereignty over all of the Kurils granted under the
terms of the Treaty of St. Petersburg. In sum, the net effect of
the early treaties between Japan and Russia was to give Japan

Noda).
79.
omatic
80.
81.

Vienna Convention, supra note 64, art. 59. In addition, it is probably axithat a later treaty must govern over an inconsistent prior treaty.
Treaty of Shimoda, supra note 15, art. 11; see also Map, supra part I.
Treaty of St. Petersburg, supra note 16, art. 11; see also Map, supra part I.
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full legal title not only to the four disputed islands, but t o all of
the Kuril Islands, together with the southern half of Sakhalin.
2. The Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact

By signing the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact82on April
14, 1941, Japan and Russia mutually promised t o maintain
peaceful relations with each other, to remain neutral in case
either party should become involved in hostilities with any
other party, and to respect each other's territorial integrity. By
its terms, the pact was to remain in force for five years from
the date of ratification, and it was to be automatically renewed
for an additional five years unless one of the parties denounced
the pact "one year before the expiration of the term."83 On
April 5, 1945, Russian Commissar of Foreign Affairs Viacheslav
Molotov announced the Soviet Union's intent not to renew the
treaty.84By declaring war against Japan on August 9, 1945,
the Soviets made it clear that either the pact was no longer in
force or the Soviets would no longer abide by it even if it were
in force.
"Japanese and Russians still disagree on whether the pact
was or was not in effect after [April 5, 1945].''85 The Russians
claim that Japan forfeited all assurances contained in the pact
"[bly reneging on [its separate] promise to liquidate north
Sakhalin oil and coal concessions and by aiding Germany in an
aggressive war against the Soviet Uni~n.'"~However, this
argument is flawed because the oil and coal concessions were
actually made in a separate agreement and were not part of
the Neutrality pact." According to international law, the material breach of an agreement gives the injured party the right
to cancel the agreement? However, the breach of one agreement does not grant the injured party the right to cancel a
separate agreement. Given this principle, the Soviet entry into

82.
Neutrality Pact, supra note 20.
83.
Id. art. 111.
84.
STEPHAN,
supra note 4, at 205 n.16.
Id.
85.
Id. at 204; see also LENSEN,supra note 19, at 127-29, 279-81.
86.
87.
See LENSEN,supra note 19, at 277-81. The concessions were part of an
agreement entitled the "Protocol on the Liquidation of the Japanese Oil and Coal
Concessions in North Sakhalin." This agreement came as a result of efforts to
implement the understanding reached and embodied in the Neutrality Pad. The
"Protocol"was signed in Moscow on March 30, 1944. Id. at 279-81.
88.
2 OPPENHEIM,supra note 49, 8 547.
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the war was a flagrant breach of the terms of its Neutrality
Pact with Japan.
3. The Cairo Declaration

The Cairo Declaration was not a treaty per se, but was
simply a statement of common purposes by the United States,
Great Britain, and China regarding Japan." Japan and the
Soviet Union were not parties to this agreement, although
.~~
Stalin later expressed full approval of the D e c l a r a t i ~ n The
declaration expressed the parties' intent to expel Japan from
certain territories which it had taken "by violence and
greed.'yg1As a mere statement of common purpose, the Declaration did not confer any rights or impose any obligations on
any party.g2
Some debate exists as to whether Japan took the Kuril
Islands by "violence and greed." However, according to the
plain meaning of that phrase, Japan's conquest of the Kurils
cannot be described as one involving "violence and greed." Japan received title to the entire chain of the Kuril Islands by the
Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875.'~ That treaty was concluded
by mutual negotiation and involved no violence.
However, some indication exists that the parties to the
Cairo Declaration intended to include the Kurils in the phrase
"all other territories . . . taken by violence and greed." Some
historians suggest that U.S. President Roosevelt was either
completely ignorant concerning Japanese possession of the
Kurils or he was willing to sacrifice a n enemy's territory to
encourage Soviet participation in the war. "[Tlhe President was
still under the misapprehension that Japan had wrenched the
Kurils from Russia in 1905 'by violence and greed', thereby
making the arc subject to the principle of territorial alienation
enunciated in the Cairo De~laration."'~If such misunder-

This is self-evident from the language of the Declaration. See First Cairo
89.
Conference, Dec. 1, 1943, 3 Bevans 858 [hereinafter Cairo Declaration]. The relevant text of the Cairo Declaration is reproduced in the appendix.
supra note 4, at 152.
STEPHAN,
90.
Cairo Declaration, supra note 89.
91.
92.
It is worth emphasizing that Japan could not be obligated under the
Declaration simply because it was not a party to and did not assent to the terms
of the Declaration. See supm text accompanying note 66.
See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
93.
supra note 4, at 154-55 (citing CHARLESE. BOHLEN,
WITNESS
TO
94.
STEPHAN,
HISTORY
1929-1969, at 196-97 (1973)).
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standing existed, President Roosevelt committed "a grievous
error for which Japan paid dearly."g5 In the final analysis,
since the Declaration was not legally binding on any party,
whether or not the Kurils were taken "by violence and greed" is
legally immaterial except insofar as the Cairo Declaration
helps interpret later agreements.
4. The Yalta Agreement

As with the Cairo Declaration, Japan was not a party t o
the Yalta Agreement. By the secret Yalta Agreement, signed on
February 11, 1945, the United States, Great Britain, and the
Soviet Union agreed that within two or three months after
Germany had surrendered, the Soviet Union would enter the
war against Japan. As a condition for the Soviet assistance in
the Far East, the parties agreed that "[tlhe former rights of
Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904
shall be restored.'*6 More specifically, the agreement stated
that "[tlhe Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet
~nion."~'
In 1956, the United States stated that it regarded the
Yalta Agreement, like the Cairo Declaration, as "simply a
statement of common purposes . . . and not as a final determination by those powers or of any legal effect in transferring
territorie~."~~
This position seems rather dubious for two reasons. First, the statement was made long after the Agreement
was concluded and seems to have been a shift in policy. Second,
the statement contradicts the United States' and Great
Britain's commitment at Yalta that the "claims of the Soviet
Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been
defeated."" This shifting of position by the United States appears t o result from political tap dancing rather than from
sound international law.loo
The integral question is whether the Yalta Agreement has
any binding force relating to the transfer of territory from JaId. at 155.
Yalta Agreement, supm note 22, cl. 2.
Id. cl. 3.
U.S. Position on SovietJapanese Peace Treaty Negotiations, DEP'T ST.
BULL.,Sept. 1956, at 484.
99.
Yalta Agreement, supra note 22.
100. For a more complete summary of the U.S. position regarding the Yalta
supra note 10, at 190-92; STEPHAN,
supra note 4, at
Agreement, see SWEARINGEN,
153-55.
95.
96.
97.
98.
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pan to Russia. The answer is that it does not. As discussed
above, the Yalta Agreement could impose no obligation on Japan to give up title to the islands unless the parties to the
Agreement intended to impose a n obligation on Japan and
Japan gave its express c~nsent.'~'Russia may be able to
claim that the former requirement was met, but no one can
plausibly argue that Japan consented to receiving such a n
o b l i g a t i ~ n . 'In
~ ~short, the Yalta Agreement, the Cairo Declaration, and the Neutrality Pact all fell short of conveying, or
imposing on Japan an obligation to convey, title to the disputed
islands to Russia.
5. The Potsdam Declaration

The Potsdam Declaration may have succeeded where the
Cairo Declaration and Yalta Agreement failed. The Potsdam
agreement, concluded in 1945 for the purpose of setting the
terms for Japanese surrender, was approve& by the United
States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Uni~n.''~Japan
accepted the Potsdam Declaration on August 14, 1945.1°4
Clause 8 of the Potsdam Declaration states, "The terms of the
Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, KJWS~U,
Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine."'" Accordingly, the question raised is whether Etorofu, Kunashiri,
Shikotan, and the Habomai Islands are considered a part of the
other minor islands as later determined.
Under a strict reading of the text of the Potsdam Declaration, the Soviet Union may have a good argument that Japan
gave up its title at least to Etorofu and Kunashiri. The declaration restricted Japan's temtory to "such minor islands" as the
parties should determine a t a later date. On September 8,
1951, Japan renounced its right and title to the Kuril
Islands.'OG Therefore, if any of the disputed islands are part

101. See supra text accompanying note 66.
102.
However, one may plausibly argue that Japan consented to give the Kurils
away by signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. For a discussion on the
effects of the 1951 treaty, see infra part N.B.6.
103.
Terms for Japanese Surrender, July 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1204 [hereinafter
Potsdam Declaration]. Clause 8 of the Potsdam Declaration is reproduced in the
supra note 4, at 245.
appendix. See also STEPHAN,
104.
supra note 4, at 198.
STEPHAN,
105.
Potsdam Declaration, supra note 103, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
106.
Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 30, art. 11, para. c.
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of the Kuril Islands, the terms of the Potsdam Declaration
certify that those islands are no longer part of Japan.'"
The relevant terms of the Potsdam Declaration are fairly
ambiguous, especially when taken in the context of the later
Treaty of San Francisco. But to the extent the language of the
Potsdam Declaration remains unclear (what are "minor islands" and who is to make this determination), international
law dictates that one consider the intent of the parties as facets
of the "preparatory work of the treaty and circumstances of its
conclusion."108Historian John J. Stephan argues that Japan
did not intend to give up its claim to the Southern Islands by
accepting the Potsdam Declaration. He states:
In accepting the Potsdam Declaration . . . Japan's leaders
anticipated deprivation of the empire's conquests and annexations made since 1895. It is problematic whether they envisaged the imminent loss of the Kurils . . . . They felt that the
southern Kurils had always been Japanese and that the central and northern parts of the chain had been peacehlly obtained in 1875 . . . . But Japan's leaders were not aware of
what had transpired at Yalta. Moreover, Soviet troops did not
land on the Kurils until 18 August.log

Japan's claim that Shikotan and the Habomais are included in "other minor islands" may survive its acceptance of the
Potsdam Declaration. But in light of the fact that Japan gave
up its claims to the "Kurile Islands" in the 1951 San Francisco
Peace Treaty, the Japanese hold on Etorofu and Kunashiri
becomes more tenuous.
6. The San Francisco Peace Treaty

At the end of World War 11, after the Japanese had surrendered and after the Soviet Union had taken possession of the
four disputed islands, Japan signed the San Francisco Peace
Treaty on September 8, 1951."' Other signatories t o the treaty included the United States and Great Britain. The Soviet
TERRITORIES,
supra note 2, at 8 (arguing that
107. But see JAPAN'S NORTHERN
the Potsdam Declaration is not valid and that, even if it were valid, the disputed
islands are included in the phrase "such minor islands as we determine"). The
question of what islands make up the "Kuril Islands" is addressed below. See infka
part IV.B.6.c.
108. Vienna Convention, supra note 64, art. 32.
supra note 4, at 198.
109. STEPHAN,
110. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 30.
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Union refused to sign the treaty, reasoning that, among other
things, the treaty would lead to a new war in the Far East."'
Regrettably, a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union was left to later negotiations between the two countries.
By signing the treaty, Japan formally renounced "all right,
title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of
Sakhalin and the islands adjacent t o it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of
Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.""~The language and circumstances of this treaty raise three important issues. First,
who was to acquire sovereignty over the territory that Japan
renounced? Second, did the Soviet Union obtain legal rights
from the treaty even though it refused to sign? Third, what are
the "Kurile Islands"?
a. Who was to obtain the Kurils renounced by Japan? In
arguing that Japan has legal rights to the four disputed
islands, the Japanese note that the San Francisco Peace Treaty
"contained no provision indicating to which country these areas
should finally bel~ng.""~They hold that the Soviet Union's
"unilateral measures" of exercising its authority over the islands "have no legal effect in transferring title to the Soviet
Uni~n.""~However, this argument does little to help Japan's
cause. Regardless of which country was to exercise sovereignty
over the Kurils, the fact remains that Japan at least gave them
away to some other entity.
The history of the prior international agreements and negotiations leading to the San Francisco Treaty leave no doubt
that the "other entity" that was to obtain the Kuril Islands was
actually the Soviet Union. The Yalta Agreement, wherein the
Soviet Union secretly agreed to assist the United States and
Great Britain in the war against Japan, expressly stated that
the Kuril Islands would be handed over to the Soviet
Union.l15 In fact, Soviet assistance against Japan was at
least partially conditioned on the "return" of the Kurils to Japan, a condition to which the United States agreed? As a
practical matter, "renunciation of the Kuriles and the southern
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
supra

See SWEARINGEN,
supra note 10, at 76-79.
Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 30, art. 11, para. c.
supra note 2, at 9.
JAPAN'SNORTHERN
TERRITORIES,
Id.
See supra notes 22-23, 96-97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 22-23, 96-97 and accompanying text; see also STEPHAN,
note 4, at 153.
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part of Sakhalin was tantamount to de facto recognition that
these territories had been ceded to the Soviet Union which
occupied them at the time."ll7
b. Did the Soviet Union gain any rights under the San
Francisco Peace Treaty? As previously established, Japan cannot rightfully claim ownership to the islands that it expressly
ceded in the 1951 treaty. And while it is incomprehensible that
any state other than the Soviet Union could have been the
intended beneficiary of the cession, it does not necessarily follow that the Soviet Union gained, by virtue of a treaty it refused to sign, automatic rights to claim the territory.
Under international law,"' the Soviet Union could obtain
rights to the Kurils under the San Francisco Treaty only if "the
parties t o the treaty intend[ed] the provision t o accord that
right" and the Soviet Union "assent[ed] thereto."llg There is a
presumption of assent.120 The actions of Russia are consistent
with this presumption because it has not refused to take title
to the Kurils and because it has continued to occupy and govern the islands to the exclusion of all other countries.
However, the parties to the San Francisco Treaty did not
intend to give the Soviet Union a right to claim the Kuril Islands. As explained above,121all parties who signed the treaty knew that, by default, the Soviet Union would continue to
occupy and govern the Kurils. But that is not to say that the
parties intended to give the Soviets the right to claim legal title
to the Kurils based on the San Francisco Treaty. Rather, the
fact that the parties to the treaty left final disposition of the
Kurils ambiguous suggests that they did not intend to confer
such a right on the Soviet Union.
The ratification proceedings in the United States Senate
lend concrete support to the argument that the San Francisco
Treaty was not intended to bestow on Russia any right t o claim
the disputed islands. Attached to the resolution of ratification
was a reservation that stated, in part, as follows:

117. L. JEROLD
ADAMS,THEORY,
LAWAND POLICY
OF CONTEMPORARY
JAPANESE
TREATIES74 (1974); see also BERNARD
C. COHEN,THE POLITICAL
AND
PROCESS
FOREIGN
POLICY:
THE MAKINGOF THE JAPANESE
SETTLEMENT
17 (1957).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
119. Vienna Convention, supra note 64, art. 35.
120. Id.
121. Supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.

750

BRIGHAMYOUNGUNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [I992

As part [of ratification] the Senate states that nothing the
treaty contains is deemed t o diminish or prejudice, in favor of
the Soviet Union, the right, title, and interest of Japan, or the
Allied Powers as defined in said treaty, in and to . . . the
Kurile Islands, the Habomai Islands, the Island of Shikotan
or any other territory, rights or interests . . . or to confer any
right, title, or benefit therein or thereto on the Soviet Union . . . .122

This reservation clearly states the Senate's intent that the San
Francisco Treaty not confer any rights on the Soviet Union,
including claims to the Kuril Islands. The resolution passed the
Senate by a vote of 66-lo.'* In short, although the parties
knew that the Soviets would effectively retain control of the
Kurils, they did not intend for the Peace Treaty to confer an
absolute Soviet right to control the islands.lZ4
c. What are the "Kurile Islands"? Perhaps the most fundamental tenet of the Japanese claim is that "the Habomais,
Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu are not included in the term
Japan contends that the Peace Confer'Kurile ~slands.'"'~~
ence at San Francisco was aware of Japan's position and that
"[tlhis understanding is also in accordance with other international arrangements binding on Japan."126Japan further emphasizes that the geography, including the flora and fauna of
Kunashiri and Etorofu, is different from that of the islands to
the north.12'

Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 30, a t 3300 (U.S. Declaration).
122.
98 CONG.REC. 2594 (1952).
123.
This distinction is probably the result of the "give and take" policy of the
124.
United States, which entered the Yalta Conference uninformed regarding the Kurils
and then shifted its position on the islands in the late 1940s. This shift in position
was due, in major part, to the onslaught of the Cold War and a reevaluation of
supm note 10, a t 190-92.
the words and deeds a t Ydta. See SWEARINGEN,
NORTHERN
TERRITORIES,
supra note 2, a t 10.
125. JAPAN'S
126. Id.
127. Id. a t 3, 10. The Japanese publication cited gives no verifiable information
regarding the dissimilar geographic conditions of the various islands. An unscientific (but fairly extensive) review by the author of several physical, geographic, and
geologic maps revealed that Kunashiri and Etorofu are hard to distinguish from
the islands to the north. The review did suggest that Shikotan and the Habomais
may be quite distinguishable from Kunashiri, Etorofu, and the other Kuril Islands.
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETYFOR EDUCATIONAL
INFORMATION,
ATLAS OF JAPAN-PHYSICAL, ECONOMIC,
AND SOCIAL10-11 (1974) (showing that the geologic
makeup of Shikotan and the Habomais is different from that of Kunashiri); see
also STEPHAN,supra note 4, a t 11-21.
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If these arguments are correct, the four named islands
should be considered "minor islands" that the Potsdam Declaration left to Japan. However, Japan has no legal claim to any
island that is part of the "Kuriles" because Japan unequivocally
gave up all right and title to the Kuril Islands at San Francis~ 0 . l ~ ~

On the basis of the historical evidence, Shikotan and the
Habomai Island group should not be considered part of the
Kurils and were not considered such by the parties to the
Peace Treaty. Therefore, they should be returned to Japan. On
the other hand, Kunashiri and Etorofu should be regarded as
part of the Kurils to which Japan has no legal claim.12'
The text of the San Francisco Treaty does not define or
declare exactly what islands are included in the Kurils. Accordingly, legal analysts must resort to other sources of interpretation, such as other relevant agreements, the intent of the parties to the treaty, and the historical definition of the Kurils.
Early agreements that set a boundary between Japan and
Russia are of little help in defining the "Kuriles" because the
relevant phrases of the agreements are subject to multiple
interpretations. The Treaty of Shimoda gave "Etorofu . . . and
the other Kuril Islands to the north . . . [to] Russia."130"Other" in this phrase could mean either those Kuril Islands other
than Etorofu or those Kuril Islands other than those given to
Japan. Unfortunately, the language is inconclusive.
Likewise, the relevant language of the Treaty of St. Petersburg is unclear. That agreement gave to Japan "the group of
This phrase may
Kuril islands which [Russia] posse~ses."'~~
suggest that Japan was receiving only that portion of the
Kurils which Russia then possessed. On the other hand, the
phrase could also be read to mean that Russia previously possessed all of the Kuril Islands, but was now giving all of them
t o Japan. In short, prior agreements on the boundary issue do
not clarify the definition of the "Kuriles."
The records of the negotiation and ratification of the Peace
Treaty provide some evidence of what the parties meant by

128. See supra text accompanying note 112.
129.
This comment does not discuss whether it might be politically wise for
Russia to make concessions on Kunashiri and Etorofu to obtain badly needed
economic assistance from Japan.
130.
Treaty of Shimoda, supra note 15, art. 11.
131. Treaty of St. Petersburg, supra note 16, art. 11.
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"Kuriles." These records suggest that the parties included
Kunashiri and Etorofu, but not Shikotan and the Habomais, in
the definition of Kurils. For example, a statement given by
Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida a t the San Francisco Conference suggests that he knew Japan was, at a minimum,
renouncing title to Kunashiri and Etorofu.ls2 After expressing
his hope that the United States and Great Britain would quickly return the administration of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan,
the Prime Minister spoke of the "Southern Kuriles" that were
occupied by the Soviet Union as of September 20, 1945.
Although Prime Minister Yoshida made no request for the
return of the Southern Kurils, he did specifically mention
Habomai and Shikotan by name and reaffirmed Japan's claim
to these two islands.lss Yoshida's lack of any reference to
Kunashiri and Etorofu indicates that he considered those islands part of the previously mentioned "Southern Kuriles."
At the same conference, John Foster Dulles, the U.S. representative, expressly stated the U.S. view that the Habomai
Islands were not included in the geographical name "Kurile
Islands" as used in article 2(c) of the treaty? Dulles' statement did not clarify whether the other disputed islands were
part of the Kurils.
The reservation attached to the treaty by the United States
Senate also supports the proposition that the United States
defined the Kurils to include Kunashiri and Etorofu, but not
Shikotan and the H a b ~ m a i s . 'The
~ ~ reservation expressed the
Senate's intent that the treaty not give the Soviets any new
rights to "the Kurile Islands, the Habomai Islands, [or] the
Island of Shikotan."lsp This language clearly distinguishes
Shikotan and the Habomais from the Kurils. Since the Senate
made no express reference to Kunashiri and Etorofu, it can be
presumed that the Senate intended to include those islands in
the term "Kurile Islands."

132. JAPAN,MINISTRYOF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, JAPANESEPEACECONFERENCE
PROVISIONAL
VERBATIM
MINUTES
327-32 11.23 (undated), reprinted in RAJENDRA
K.
JAW,JAPAN'S POSTWAR
PEACESMTLEMENTS
369-73 (1978).
133. Id. at 370.
134. Statement by John Foster Dulles, DEP? ST. BULL.,Sept. 17, 1951, at 452,
454.
135. Since the assent of the United States Senate was required to bind the
United States to the terms of the treaty, the meaning attached to the treaty by
the Senate is relevant to interpreting any ambiguities in the treaty.
136. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 30, at 3300 (U.S. Declaration).
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Also persuasive is the argument that "[wlhen Japan renounced all rights t o the 'Kurile Islands' a t San Francisco,
'Kurile' was universally understood to include Kunashiri and
[Et~rofu]."'~~
By the time the treaty was signed in 1951,-the
Soviet Union had occupied the entire chain of Kurils, including
Etorofu and Kunashiri, for six years. It is illogical for Japan to
cede a chain of islands that have the same geographic and geologic characteristicsls8 and that are all occupied by a foreign
power, and then later contend that the two southernmost islands are not part of that chain.
Japan legitimately claims that Shikotan and the Habomai
Islands are distinct from the Kurils. Geographically, those
islands are separated from the chain of Kurils and seem to be
more closely associated with Hokkaido than with the
K u r i l ~ . 'Even
~ ~ the Russians have historically called these islands the "Little Kurils" as distinct from the " K ~ r i l s . " 'By
~~
ceding the "Kuriles," Japan did not cede islands that are not
part of the "Kuriles." No evidence exists that Shikotan and the
Habomai group have historically been considered part of the
Kuril chain or that the signatories to the San Francisco Treaty
considered them to be so.

The dispute over a small number of islands off the coast of
Hokkaido has caused a rift in Russo-Japanese relations since
the end of World War 11. To this day the disagreement continues to be a barrier to a Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty which
would officially end the war.
Under customary international law of prior discovery and
conquest, neither country can legally claim title to the disputed
islands. Conquest was not recognized as a legal method of
acquiring title to land in 1945. Therefore, Russia cannot base
its claim to the disputed territories on the legal theory of conquest. As for the right to the territory by prior discovery, it is
unclear who initially discovered and settled the Kuril Islands.
Regardless of which party was first, the status of the territories
has been modified by treaty.

137.
138.
139.
140.

STEPHAN,
supra note 4, at 211 (emphasis added).

Id. at 11-21.
See Map, supra part I.
STEPHAN,
supra note 4, at 11.
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Japan and Russia have been parties to several international agreements concerning the boundary between the two nations. Under the terms of the early agreements, Japan had
clear title to the islands in dispute until 1945, when it accepted
the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. By expressly accepting
the Potsdam Declaration and later expressly ceding the
"Kuriles," Japan gave away its right to claim any islands that
are part of the "Kuriles." Examination of the intent of the parties to the San Francisco Treaty, the historical treatment of the
islands and their geography and geology, conclusively indicates
that Etorofu and Kunashiri are part of the Kuril Islands, but
that Shikotan and the Habomai group are not. Accordingly,
Russia has rightful title to Etorofu and Kunashiri, but should
be required to return Shikotan and the Habomais to Japan.

Keith A. Call
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Appendix
Relevant Treaties and Agreements
I. ARTICLES31 AND 32 OF THE VIENNACONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES~~'

Article 31
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given t o the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the
treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
comexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the
other parties as an instrument related t o the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the
context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Article 32
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion, in order t o confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
141.

Vienna Convention, supra note 64, arts. 31-32.
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(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

Article I1
Henceforth the boundaries between Russia and Japan will
pass between the islands Etorofu and Uruppu. The whole island of Etorofu belongs to Japan and the whole island of
Uruppu and the other Kuril Islands to the north constitute
possessions of Russia. As regards the island Karafuto
(Sakhalin), it remains unpartitioned between Russia and Japan, as has been the case up t o this time.

Article I1
In exchange for the cession to Russia of the rights on the
island of Sakhalin, stipulated in the first article, His Majesty
the Emperor of all the Russias, for Himself and His descendants, cedes to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the group of
the Kuril islands which he possesses at present, together with
all the rights of sovereignty appertaining to this possession, so
that henceforth the said group of Kuril islands shall belong t o
the Empire of Japan. This group comprises the following eighteen islands: [eighteen islands from Uruppu north to Araido
are specifically named], so that the boundary between the Empires of Russia and Japan in these areas shall pass through the
Strait between Cape Lopatka of the peninsula of Kamchatka
and the island of Shimushu.
NEUTRALITY
PACT(APR. 13, 1941)'"
IV. SOVIET-JAPANESE

Article I
Both contracting parties undertake to maintain peaceful
and friendly relations between themselves and mutually to
respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other
contracting party.

142.
143.
144.

Treaty of Shimoda, supra note 15, art. II.
Treaty of St. Petersburg, supra note 16, art. II.
Neutrality Pact, supra note 20, arts. I-III.
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Article II
Should one of the contracting parties become the object of
hostilities on the part of one or several third Powers, the other
contracting party will observe neutrality throughout the entire
duration of the conflict.

Article 111
The present pact comes into force from the day of its ratification by both contracting parties and shall remain valid for
five years. Should neither of the contracting parties denounce
the pact one year before expiration of the term, it will be considered automatically prolonged for the following five years.
V. RELEVANT
TEXTOF THECAIRODECLARATION
(Nov. 27, 1943)'~~
The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and
punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their
purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all islands in the Pacific which she has seized and occupied since the beginning of the
first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has
stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the
Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan
will also be expelled from all other territories which she has
taken by violence and greed.
(FEB.11, 1945)'~~
VI. YALTAAGREEMENT
The leaders of three Great Powers-the Soviet Union, the
United States of America and Great Britain-have agreed that
in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the
war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into
the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition
that:

....

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous
attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

145.
146.

Cairo Declaration, supra note 89.
Yalta Agreement, supra note 22.
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a. The southern part of Sakhalin as well as all islands
adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union.

....

3. The Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet
Union.

....

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that
these claims 3f the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfded after Japan has been defeated.
VII. THEPOTSDAM
DECLARATION
(JULY 26, 1945)14'.
8. The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out
and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of
Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands
as we determine.

PEACE
TREATY
VIII. THESANFRANCISCO
(SEPT.8, 1951)'~~
Article I1
(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile
Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent t o it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.

147.
148.

Potsdarn Declaration, supra note 103, cl. 8 (footnote omitted).
Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 30, art. 11, para. c.

